Article 1
[Preferential Ballot]

Each ballot shall contain a complete list of all qualified candidates. Furthermore, each voter may write in {*number of write-in options*} additional candidates. Each voter ranks these candidates in order of preference. The individual voter may give the same preference to more than one candidate, he may keep candidates unranked, and he may skip numbers. When a given voter does not rank all candidates, then it is presumed that this voter strictly prefers all ranked candidates to all not ranked candidates and that this voter is indifferent between all not ranked candidates.

Article 2
[Schulze Method]

Suppose d[V,W] is the number of valid ballots on which candidate V is strictly preferred to candidate W. Then the potential winners are determined as follows:

A "path from candidate X to candidate Y of strength z" is a sequence of candidates C(1),...,C(n) with the following four properties:

1. C(1) is identical to X.
2. C(n) is identical to Y.
3. For all i = 1,...,(n–1): d[C(i),C(i+1)] > d[C(i+1),C(i)].
4. For all i = 1,...,(n–1): d[C(i),C(i+1)] ≥ z.

p[A,B] is the maximum value such that there is a path from candidate A to candidate B of that strength. If there is no path from candidate A to candidate B at all, then p[A,B] : = 0.

For all pairs of candidates D and E, p[D,E] shall be calculated. Candidate F is a "potential winner" if and only if p[F,G] ≥ p[G,F] for every other candidate G.